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Abstract
Tournament organizers supposedly design rules such that a team cannot be better
off by exerting a lower effort. It is shown that the European qualifiers to the 2018
FIFA World Cup are not strategy-proof in this sense: a team might be eliminated if
it wins its last match in the group stage, while it advances to play-offs by playing
a draw, provided that all other results remain the same. The scenario could have
happened in October 2017, after four-fifth of all matches have already been played.
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to recent UEFA European Championships and FIFA World Cups. A mechanism is
suggested in order to seal the way of manipulation in similar group-based qualification
systems.
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1 Introduction
One important role of scientific research is to inform decision-makers about the possible
properties, especially failures of different rules and formulas. It is an essential issue on the
field of sport, since a bad regulation can easily lead to public outrage, as illustrated through
several historical examples (Kendall and Lenten, 2017). These negative events may have
contributed to the increasing popularity of operations research analysis of sport ranking
rules (Gerchak, 1994; Wright, 2009, 2014), and to the recent application of an axiomatic
approach towards sport rankings (Berker, 2014; Csato´, 2017a,b; Vaziri et al., 2017). We
aim to continue this research direction by analysing qualification tournaments with respect
to the axiom called manipulability, strategy-proofness, or incentive compatibility. If this
condition does not hold, a team1 might gain by performing worse in certain matches.
Specifically, the qualifiers to two prominent football competitions, the UEFA European
Championships and FIFA World Cups (in the European Zone) will be discussed from this
perspective. They are organized recently such that the top 𝑘 − 1 teams from each group
of size ℓ or ℓ+ 1 qualify, while the 𝑘th placed teams from each group advance to play-offs,
with a slight adjustment that either the best 𝑘th placed team qualifies or the worst 𝑘th
placed team is eliminated. Consequently, the 𝑘th placed teams – which have not played
against each other – should be compared in a subtournament where they are considered
with the same number of matches, implying the ignorance of some group matches if group
sizes vary. We get a negative result as the monotonicity of rankings for each group and
the separate subtournament for the 𝑘th placed teams is not enough to guarantee the
strategy-proofness of the whole qualification system.
The problem has still been revealed by a column in the case of the European qualification
for the 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil (Dagaev and Sonin, 2013), and has been described
by Dagaev and Sonin (2017) in a sentence: ’Two months before the end of the tournament,
with 80% of games completed, there still was a scenario under which a team might need to
achieve a draw instead of winning to go to Brazil.’2
This paper outlines a similar scenario for 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA)
by showing that a team is eliminated if it wins in the last matchday of group stage, but it
advances to play-offs by playing a draw, provided that all other results remain unchanged.
The example takes the outcome of matches played before October 2017 as given. After
that, we formalize a model of group-based qualification tournaments. A pair of theorems
lists the conditions of incentive incompatibility and strategy-proofness, respectively. They
are applied to identify nine recent qualification systems that can be manipulated. Finally,
we suggest a mechanism for tournament organizers in order to solve the problem.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we overview the related
literature. Section 3 describes the real-world example, the European section of the 2018
FIFA World Cup qualification. The incentive incompatibility of the tournament is proved
in Section 4. Section 5 presents and analyses the theoretical model, which is applied
to examine the strategy-proofness of some qualification systems in Section 6. Section 7
summarizes policy implications for tournament organizers, and Section 8 concludes.
The paper is written both for the sport and the scientific community. Decision-makers
not interested in or not familiar with the theoretical background of manipulation can skip
1 The word team is used because of the example, but it can also be a player in other settings.
2 We have written the first version of the paper without knowing about Dagaev and Sonin (2013) or
Dagaev and Sonin (2017). While it is not an excuse for the originality of the current research, this fact
indicates that the failure of qualification rules is almost obvious. It is worth to note that Dagaev and
Sonin (2017) also build on a ’borrowed’ real-world example.
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Sections 2, 5 and maybe 3 as well as 6, in order to focus on the example presented in
Section 4 and the possible remedies presented in Section 7.
2 Related work
Ranking in sport tournaments is closely related to the problem of preference aggregation.
The issue of strategy-proofness is an extensively discussed concept in social choice theory
since the well-known Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem (Gibbard, 1973; Sat-
terthwaite, 1975), which state that fairness may lead to manipulation, that is, if a voting
rule is fair, there always exists a voter who can achieve a better outcome by tactical voting.
Nonetheless, there are several cases when an incentive compatible rule can be found,
but a method used in practice is manipulable. For example, Tasna´di (2008) proved that the
Hungarian mixed-member electoral system, applied between 1990 and 2010, suffers from a
’population paradox’: the governing coalition may lose seats either by getting more votes
or by the opposition obtaining fewer votes. Similarly, (Ko´czy and Strobel, 2009) found
that the invariant method (Pinski and Narin, 1976), characterised by Palacios-Huerta and
Volij (2004), and used to rank academic journals by quality violates strategy-proofness as
a journal can boost its performance by making additional citations to other journals.
Some recent works address the incentive (in)compatibility of sport ranking rules.
Stanton and Williams (2013) investigate double-elimination tournaments (a competition
where no participant is eliminated until it lost two matches) and show that they are
vulnerable to manipulation by a coalition of players who can improve their chance of
winning by throwing matches. Russell and Walsh (2009) and Schneider et al. (2016) also
discuss manipulation by coalitions through a collusion between several teams. Pauly (2014)
develops a mathematical model of strategic manipulation in round-robin subtournaments
and derives an impossibility theorem. Vong (2017) considers the strategic manipulation
problem in multistage tournaments and shows that it is necessary to allow only the
top-ranked player to qualify from each group in order to guarantee that all players exert
full effort. Russell (2010) studies the complexity of manipulation strategies in knock-out
and round-robin tournaments as well as presents some algorithms which are able to
identify with high accuracy whether a coalition manipulates the tournament. Lasek et al.
(2016) suggest some strategies for improving a team’s position in the official ranking of
international football teams compiled by FIFA.
Strategy-proofness is usually violated because being ranked lower in the group stage
might lead to facing a more preferred competitor in the following knock-out stage, but
this means an advantage only in expected terms. Dagaev and Sonin (2017) prove that
tournament systems, consisting of multiple round-robin and knock-out tournaments with
noncumulative prizes, are characteristically incentive incompatible in a stronger sense since
a team may be strictly better off by exerting a lower effort. Tournaments with subsequent
group stages, widely used in handball, also violate strategy-proofness if some results are
carried over (Csato´, 2017c). Furthermore, there were two historical matches where a team
was ex ante disinterested in winning by a high margin.
In the following, we will discuss this strong version of manipulation when a team is
guaranteed to gain from a worse result.
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3 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA)
2018 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA) is the European section of the 2018 FIFA3
World Cup qualification, the qualifier of national association football teams which are
members of UEFA4 for the 2018 FIFA World Cup, to be held in Russia.5 Russia automati-
cally qualified as a host, so – after Gibraltar and Kosovo became a FIFA member in May
2016 – 54 teams competed in the qualification for 13 slots in the final tournament.
The qualifying format was confirmed by the UEFA Executive Committee meeting on
22-23 March 2015 in Vienna. The qualification structure is as follows:
∙ Group stage (first round): Nine groups of six teams each, playing home-and-away
round-robin matches. The winners of each group qualify to the 2018 FIFA World
Cup, and the eight best runners-up advance to play-offs (second round).
∙ Play-offs (second round): The eight best second-placed teams from the group
stage play home-and-away matches over two legs. The four winners qualify to the
2018 FIFA World Cup.
We focus on the first round. FIFA (2016, Article 20.4a) specifies this stage.
The matches shall be played in accordance with one of the following three formats:
a) in groups composed of several teams on a home-and-away basis, with three points
for a win, one point for a draw and no points for a defeat (league format).
Tie-breaking rules in the groups are detailed in FIFA (2016, Article 20.6).
In the league format, the ranking in each group is determined as follows:
a) greatest number of points obtained in all group matches;
b) goal difference in all group matches;
c) greatest number of goals scored in all group matches.
If two or more teams are equal on the basis of the above three criteria, their rankings shall
be determined as follows:
d) greatest number of points obtained in the group matches between the teams con-
cerned;
e) goal difference resulting from the group matches between the teams concerned;
f) greater number of goals scored in all group matches between the teams concerned;
3 FIFA stands for Fe´de´ration Internationale de Football Association, French for International Federation
of Association Football, which is the international governing body of association football, futsal, and
beach soccer.
4 UEFA stands for Union of European Football Associations, the administrative body for association
football in Europe. However, several UEFA member states are primarily or entirely located in Asia. It is
one of the six continental confederations of world football’s governing body FIFA.
5 This section is mainly based on the Wikipedia page of 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA).
We will cite only those official documents which concern the ranking of teams.
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g) the goals scored away from home count double between the teams concerned (if
the tie is only between two teams).
h) fair play points system in which the number of yellow and red cards in all group
matches is considered according to the following deductions:
– first yellow card: minus 1 point
– second yellow card/indirect red card: minus 3 points
– direct red card: minus 4 points
– yellow card and direct red card: minus 5 points;
i) drawing of lots by the FIFA Organising Committee.
Strangely, FIFA (2016, Article 20.6) does not state explicitly that greater goal differences
and fair play points are preferred.6 Choice of the eight best second-placed teams is not
addressed in this document. FIFA (2016, Article 20.8) only describes that
Should the best second- or third-placed team within a group stage qualify for the next stage
or for the final competition, the criteria to decide such best second- or third-placed team
shall depend on the competition format and shall require the approval of FIFA following
proposals from the confederations.
We were not able to find the relevant regulation of UEFA. But, according to a FIFA
(FIFA, 2017) Media Release – reinforced by an earlier UEFA news (UEFA, 2016) –,
the eight best runners-up will be decided by ranking criteria as stated in the 2018 FIFA
World Cup Regulations, namely points, goal difference, goals scored, goals scored away from
home and disciplinary ranking, with the results against teams ranked 6th not being taken
into account.
Since head-to-head results are nonexistent in the comparison of runners-up, the ranking
of second-placed teams strictly follow tie-breaking in groups, with the crucial difference of
discarding two matches played against the last team of the group.7
Another confederation of FIFA, the AFC (Asian Football Confederation) has published
a Media Release (AFC, 2015) on the ranking of runners-up, which provides an illustration
6 The purpose of mixing words greater and greatest is not clear for us.
7 However, there was some controversy around the ranking of second-placed teams. According to our
knowledge, FIFA and UEFA did not publish the ranking of second-placed teams before the end of group
stage. The Spanish Wikipedia page of 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA) ranked the runners-up
on the basis of all matches played even on 12 September 2017. Most Wikipedia pages of the qualification,
like the English, French, or Hungarian have placed Sweden on the 6th and Montenegro on the 7th position
on 12 September 2017, after eight matchdays were played. On the other hand, Montenegro was the
6th and Sweden the 7th in German and Italian. As one can check in Tables 2 and A.4, Sweden and
Montenegro had the same goal difference (+3) and number of goals scored (10) at that time. Furthermore,
both teams scored 4 goals away from home. There is a difference in the goals against them at home, other
teams of the group (without the last) had scored 2 goals in Sweden and 3 in Montenegro. It may be
a weak argument to rank Sweden higher, nevertheless, in the lack of exact rules, we are not sure. It is
also possible that disciplinary points count, but then with or without the matches against the last team?
Anyway, it is rather an academic issue as it obviously does not influence which teams advance to play-offs.
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on how to calculate the ranking of second-placed teams when some group matches are
discarded.8
It will turn out that this, seemingly minor, modification in the comparison of runners-up
has some unintended consequences regarding manipulation.
4 The possible manipulation
In this section we will present a possible manipulation of the European qualifiers to the
2018 FIFA World Cup.9 Matches of the first eight matchdays – to be played between 4
September 2016 and 5 September 2017 – are assumed to be given.
Proposition 4.1. It might still happen after four-fifth of all matches are over that 2018
FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA) can be manipulated by Bulgaria playing a draw
instead of a win against Luxembourg in the last matchday, on 10 October 2017.
Proof. We provide an example by generating hypothetical results for the last two matchdays,
to be played between 5 October 2017 and 10 October 2017.10 Eight groups are detailed
in the Appendix: Table A.1 presents Group B; Table A.2 presents Group C; Table A.3
presents Group D; Table A.4 presents Group E; Table A.5 presents Group F; Table A.6
presents Group G; Table A.7 presents Group H; and Table A.8 presents Group I.
Table 1 shows a possible scenario in Group A. Note that some results of Table 1.b may
be unreasonable, like Belarus defeating Netherlands by 7-0. They are necessary to create
the appropriate conditions for manipulation. Nevertheless, this set of match results still
had a positive probability after eight matchdays were over.
On the basis of standings in Group A-I, runners-up are ranked in Table 2. Only the
eight best second-places team advance to play-offs, hence Bulgaria is eliminated.
However, consider what happens if Bulgaria plays a draw of 1-1 against Luxembourg
in the last matchday on 10 October 2017. It is clear that this change worsen Bulgaria’s
standing in the group. Nevertheless, it remains the runner-up with 16 points as both
Bulgaria and Sweden would have the same goal difference (+4) with Bulgaria scoring more
goals in all group matches (22 vs 18). On the other hand, Luxembourg overtakes Belarus
thanks to its newly obtained draw: it has the same goal difference (−6) with more goals
scored (12 vs 11). In the ranking of second-placed teams, matches against the last team
are discarded. Consequently, Bulgaria would have 13 points, placing it seventh among
the runners-up according to Table 2 (it has the same goal difference as Greece with more
goals scored). Thus Bulgaria would advance to play-offs instead of Montenegro if it would
concede a goal against Luxembourg.
8 Runners-up should be ranked in the second round of the Asian section of the 2018 FIFA World Cup
qualification, organized for national teams which are members of AFC. AFC (2015) lists the following
criteria as tie-breaking rules in this case: greatest number of points obtained from group matches; goal
difference in group matches; greatest number of goals scored in group matches; fewer number of points
calculated according to the number of yellow and red cards received by the team; drawing of lots. Number
of goals scored away from home does not appear among the criteria and the preferred direction of
goal difference is not specified, although it is provided for fair play points in contrast to FIFA (2017,
Article 20.6).
9 Perhaps the best summary of 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA) is its Wikipedia page, too.
However, a national team in Group G was referred to as Macedonia (at least on 12 September 2017), while
its official name used by FIFA and UEFA is FYR Macedonia, as the country was admitted by United
Nations under the provisional description the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
10 It is worth to note that all teams play one match home and one away in the last two matchdays,
which is not true for two subsequent matchdays chosen arbitrarily.
7
Table 1: 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification – UEFA Group A
(a) Match results of the first eight matchdays
Position is given according to the eight matches already played
Home team is in the row, away team (represented by its position) is in the column
Dates are given for the matches to be played on the last two matchdays in 2017
Position Team 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 France — 2-1 4-0 4-1 0-0 10 Oct
2 Sweden 2-1 — 1-1 3-0 7 Oct 4-0
3 Netherlands 0-1 10 Oct — 3-1 5-0 4-1
4 Bulgaria 7 Oct 3-2 2-0 — 4-3 1-0
5 Luxembourg 1-3 0-1 1-3 10 Oct — 1-0
6 Belarus 0-0 0-4 7 Oct 2-1 1-1 —
(b) Hypothetical match results of the last two matchdays
Last row shows an alternative result, obtained if Bulgaria manipulates
Date Home team Away team Result
7 October 2017 Sweden Luxemburg 0-4
7 October 2017 Belarus Netherlands 7-0
7 October 2017 Bulgaria France 8-0
10 October 2017 France Belarus 1-0
10 October 2017 Luxemburg Bulgaria 0-1
10 October 2017 Netherlands Sweden 3-0
10 October 2017* Luxemburg* Bulgaria* 1-1*
(c) Final standing with the runner-up results
Pos = Position; W = Won; D = Drawn; L = Loss; GF = Goals for; GA = Goals against; GD = Goal
difference; Pts = Points. All teams have played 10 matches.
Last but one row contains the second-placed team’s benchmark results, adjusted for the ranking of the
runners-up (matches played against the 6th team are discarded) according to FIFA (2017).
Last row contains the second-placed team’s alternative results, adjusted for the ranking of the runners-up
(matches played against the 6th team are discarded) according to FIFA (2017), obtained if Bulgaria
manipulates.
Pos Team W D L GF GA GD Pts
1 France 6 2 2 16 13 3 20
2 Bulgaria 6 0 4 22 17 5 18
3 Sweden 5 1 4 18 14 4 16
4 Netherlands 5 1 4 19 18 1 16
5 Belarus 2 2 6 11 17 -6 8
6 Luxembourg 2 2 6 11 18 -7 8
2 Bulgaria 4 0 4 17 14 3 12
2* Bulgaria* 4* 1* 3* 20* 16* 4* 13*
The example used in the proof of Proposition 4.1 is robust with respect to Groups B-I.
If one considers the actual match results for these groups instead of the hypothetical ones,
Slovakia is the worst second-placed teams with 12 points and a goal difference of +5 among
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Table 2: 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA) – Ranking of second-placed teams
Pos = Position; W = Won; D = Drawn; L = Loss; GF = Goals for; GA = Goals against; GD = Goal
difference; Pts = Points.
Since matches played against the 6th team in each group are discarded (FIFA, 2017), all teams have
played 8 matches taken into account.
Last row contains Bulgaria’s alternative results, obtained if it manipulates.
Pos Team Group W D L GF GA GD Pts
1 Portugal B 6 1 1 23 5 18 19
2 Italy G 6 1 1 14 8 6 19
3 Northern Ireland C 4 2 2 9 3 6 14
4 Wales D 3 5 0 8 5 3 14
5 Turkey I 4 2 2 8 8 0 14
6 Slovakia F 4 1 3 11 5 6 13
7 Greece H 3 4 1 8 4 4 13
8 Montenegro E 3 3 2 12 6 6 12
9 Bulgaria A 4 0 4 17 14 3 12
7* Bulgaria* A 4* 1* 3* 20* 16* 4* 13*
the runners-up. Bulgaria is still eliminated by winning against Luxembourg according
to Table 1.c, but is advanced to play-offs if it plays a draw of 1-1. Hence manipulation
mainly depends on the events in Group A.
5 Theoretical background
In the following, we build a model for the home-and-away round-robin group stage of a
qualification.
Definition 5.1. Home-and-away round-robin tournament: Let 𝑋 be a nonempty finite set
of at least two teams, 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 be two teams and 𝑣 : 𝑋×𝑋 → {(𝑣1; 𝑣2) : 𝑣1, 𝑣2 ∈ N}∪{—}
be a function such that 𝑣(𝑥, 𝑦) = — if and only if 𝑥 = 𝑦. The pair (𝑋, 𝑣) is called a
home-and-away round-robin tournament.
In a home-and-away round-robin tournament, any two teams play each other once
at home and once at away. Function 𝑣 describes game results with the number of goals
scored by the home and away teams, respectively.
Definition 5.2. Ranking in home-and-away round-robin tournaments: Let 𝒳 be the set
of home-and-away round-robin tournaments with a set of teams 𝑋. A ranking method 𝑆
is a function that maps any characteristic function 𝑣 of 𝒳 into a strict order 𝑆(𝑣) on the
set 𝑋.
Let (𝑋, 𝑣) be a home-and-away round-robin tournament, 𝑆(𝑣) be its ranking and
𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋, 𝑥 ̸= 𝑦 be two different teams. 𝑥 is ranked higher (lower) than 𝑦 if and only if
𝑥 ≻𝑆(𝑣) 𝑦 (𝑥 ≺𝑆(𝑣) 𝑦).
Let 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋, 𝑥 ≠ 𝑦 be two different teams and 𝑣(𝑥, 𝑦) = (𝑣1(𝑥, 𝑦); 𝑣2(𝑥, 𝑦)). It is said
that team 𝑥 wins over team 𝑦 if 𝑣1(𝑥, 𝑦) > 𝑣2(𝑥, 𝑦) (home) or 𝑣1(𝑦, 𝑥) < 𝑣2(𝑦, 𝑥) (away),
team 𝑥 loses to team 𝑦 if 𝑣1(𝑥, 𝑦) < 𝑣2(𝑥, 𝑦) (home) or 𝑣1(𝑦, 𝑥) > 𝑣2(𝑦, 𝑥) (away) and
teams 𝑥 draws with team 𝑦 if 𝑣1(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑣2(𝑥, 𝑦).
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Definition 5.3. Number of points: Let (𝑋, 𝑣) be a home-and-away round-robin tournament
and 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 be a team. Denote by 𝑁𝑤𝑣 (𝑥) the number of wins and by 𝑁𝑑𝑣 (𝑥) the number
of draws of team 𝑥 in (𝑋, 𝑣), respectively. The number of points of team 𝑥 is 𝑠𝑣(𝑥) =
𝛼𝑁𝑤𝑣 (𝑥) +𝑁𝑑𝑣 (𝑥) such that 𝛼 ≥ 2.
In other words, a win means 𝛼 points, a draw means 1 point and a loss means 0 points.
Number of points does not necessarily give a strict order on the set of teams, therefore
some tie-breaking rules should be introduced.
Definition 5.4. Goal difference: Let (𝑋, 𝑣) be a home-and-away round-robin tournament
and 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 be a team. The goal difference of team 𝑥 is
𝑔𝑑𝑣(𝑥) =
∑︁
𝑦∈𝑋,𝑦 ̸=𝑥
(𝑣1(𝑥, 𝑦)− 𝑣2(𝑥, 𝑦)) +
∑︁
𝑦∈𝑋,𝑦 ̸=𝑥
(𝑣2(𝑦, 𝑥)− 𝑣1(𝑦, 𝑥)) .
Goal difference equals to the number of goals scored for team 𝑥 minus the number of
goals scored against team 𝑥.
Definition 5.5. Head-to-head results: Let (𝑋, 𝑣) be a home-and-away round-robin tour-
nament and 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 be a team. Denote by 𝐿 ⊆ 𝑋 ∖ {𝑥} a set of teams.
The head-to-head number of points of team 𝑥 with respect to 𝐿 in (𝑋, 𝑣) is
𝑠𝐿𝑣 (𝑥) = 𝛼 (| {𝑦 ∈ 𝐿 : 𝑣1(𝑥, 𝑦) > 𝑣2(𝑥, 𝑦)} |+ | {𝑦 ∈ 𝐿 : 𝑣1(𝑦, 𝑥) < 𝑣2(𝑦, 𝑥)} |) +
+| {𝑦 ∈ 𝐿 : 𝑣1(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑣2(𝑥, 𝑦)} |+ | {𝑦 ∈ 𝐿 : 𝑣1(𝑦, 𝑥) = 𝑣2(𝑦, 𝑥)} |
The head-to-head goal difference of team 𝑥 with respect to 𝐿 in (𝑋, 𝑣) is
𝑔𝑑𝐿𝑣 (𝑥) =
∑︁
𝑦∈𝐿
(𝑣1(𝑥, 𝑦)− 𝑣2(𝑥, 𝑦)) +
∑︁
𝑦∈𝐿
(𝑣2(𝑦, 𝑥)− 𝑣1(𝑦, 𝑥)) .
Definition 5.6. Monotonicity of group ranking: Let 𝒳 be the set of home-and-away
round-robin tournaments with a set of teams 𝑋, and 𝑆 be a ranking method. 𝑆 is
monotonic if for any characteristic function 𝑣 and for any different teams 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋, 𝑥 ̸= 𝑦:
1. 𝑠𝑣(𝑥) > 𝑠𝑣(𝑦)⇒ 𝑥 ≻𝑆(𝑣) 𝑦;
2. 𝑠𝑣(𝑥) = 𝑠𝑣(𝑦) and 𝑔𝑑𝑣(𝑥) > 𝑔𝑑𝑣(𝑦), furthermore, 𝑠𝐿𝑣 (𝑥) > 𝑠𝐿𝑣 (𝑦), or 𝑠𝐿𝑣 (𝑥) = 𝑠𝐿𝑣 (𝑦)
and 𝑔𝑑𝐿𝑣 (𝑥) > 𝑔𝑑𝐿𝑣 (𝑦) where 𝑧 ∈ 𝐿 if and only if 𝑠𝑣(𝑥) = 𝑠𝑣(𝑦) = 𝑠𝑣(𝑧)⇒ 𝑥 ≻𝑆(𝑣) 𝑦.
Monotonicity implies that (a) a team should be ranked higher if it has a greater number
of points (criterion 1); (b) a team should be ranked higher compared to another with
the same number of points, an inferior goal difference and worse head-to-head results
against all teams with the same number of points (criterion 2). Monotonicity still does not
always lead to a unique ranking. The complexity of Definition 5.6 is necessary in order to
cover the different tie-breaking rules recently applied by FIFA (goal difference) and UEFA
(head-to-head results). See Berker (2014, Table 6) for a short overview of them.
Definition 5.7. Group-based qualifier : A group-based qualifier 𝒯 consists of 𝑘 groups of
home-and-away round-robin tournaments with the set of teams 𝑋1, 𝑋2, . . . , 𝑋𝑘 such that
𝑋 𝑖 ∩𝑋ℎ = ∅ for any 𝑖 ̸= ℎ.
Definition 5.8. Allocation rule: An allocation rule of a group-based qualifier 𝒯 is a
function ℛ : 𝒳 1 ×𝒳 2 × · · · × 𝒳 𝑘 → {0; 1; 2}.
10
Consider a group-based qualifier 𝒯 , its allocation rule ℛ, a set of group results
𝑉 =
{︁
𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣𝑘
}︁
and a team 𝑥 ∈ ∪𝑘𝑖=1𝑋 𝑖. Team 𝑥 is said to be (a) directly qualified if
ℛ(𝑉, 𝑥) = 2; (b) advanced to the next round with a chance to qualify if ℛ(𝑉, 𝑥) = 1; (c)
eliminated if ℛ(𝑉, 𝑥) = 0.
Definition 5.9. Qualification system: The pair (𝒯 ,ℛ) of a group-based qualifier 𝒯 and
its allocation rule ℛ is a qualification system.
In order to fit 2018 FIFAWorld Cup qualification (UEFA) into this model, the allocation
rule is allowed to compare teams from different groups through the introduction of an
extra group.
Definition 5.10. Extra group function: Let (𝒯 ,ℛ) be a qualification system. Extra
group function 𝒢 associates to any set of group results 𝑉 =
{︁
𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣𝑘
}︁
a set of teams
𝑋𝑘+1 ⊆ ∪𝑘𝑖=1𝑋 𝑖 and a set 𝑋 𝑖𝑥 ⊆ 𝑋 𝑖 ∖ {𝑥} for each 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋𝑘+1.
Definition 5.11. Extra group ranking: Let (𝒯 ,ℛ) be a qualification system and 𝒢 be an
extra group function. An extra group ranking method 𝑄 is a function that maps any set of
group results 𝑉 =
{︁
𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣𝑘
}︁
into a strict order on the set 𝑋𝑘+1.
Definition 5.12. Ranking in extra group: Let (𝒯 ,ℛ) be a qualification system and 𝒢 be
an extra group function. The number of points in the extra group of team 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋𝑘+1 is
𝑠𝑘+1𝒢,𝑉 (𝑥) = 𝛼
(︁
|
{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖𝑥 : 𝑣𝑖1(𝑥, 𝑦) > 𝑣𝑖2(𝑥, 𝑦)
}︁
|+ |
{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖𝑥 : 𝑣𝑖1(𝑦, 𝑥) < 𝑣𝑖2(𝑦, 𝑥)
}︁
|
)︁
+
+|
{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖𝑥 : 𝑣𝑖1(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑣𝑖2(𝑥, 𝑦)
}︁
|+ |
{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖𝑥 : 𝑣𝑖1(𝑦, 𝑥) = 𝑣𝑖2(𝑦, 𝑥)
}︁
|
The goal difference in the extra group of team 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋𝑘+1 is
𝑔𝑑𝑘+1𝒢,𝑉 (𝑥) =
∑︁
𝑦∈𝑋𝑖𝑥
(︁
𝑣𝑖1(𝑥, 𝑦)− 𝑣𝑖2(𝑥, 𝑦)
)︁
+
∑︁
𝑦∈𝑋𝑖𝑥
(︁
𝑣𝑖2(𝑦, 𝑥)− 𝑣𝑖1(𝑦, 𝑥)
)︁
.
Note that teams of 𝑋𝑘+1 have not necessarily played against each other – so head-to-
head results may be missing – since there are no further matches in the extra group, but
their number of points and goal difference can be defined on the basis of certain group
matches.
Definition 5.13. Monotonicity of extra group ranking: Let (𝒯 ,ℛ) be a qualification
system and 𝒢 be an extra group function. Extra group ranking 𝑄 is said to be monotonic
if for any set of group results 𝑉 = {𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣𝑘} and for any different teams 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋𝑘+1,
𝑥 ̸= 𝑦:
1. 𝑠𝑘+1𝒢,𝑉 (𝑥) > 𝑠𝑘+1𝒢,𝑉 (𝑦)⇒ 𝑥 ≻𝑄(𝑉 ) 𝑦;
2. 𝑠𝑘+1𝒢,𝑉 (𝑥) = 𝑠𝑘+1𝒢,𝑉 (𝑦) and 𝑔𝑑𝑘+1𝒢,𝑉 (𝑥) > 𝑔𝑑𝑘+1𝒢,𝑉 (𝑦)⇒ 𝑥 ≻𝑄(𝑉 ) 𝑦.
Definition 5.13 is simpler than Definition 5.6 due to the lack of head-to-head results in
the extra group.
Definition 5.14. Fairness of an allocation rule: Let (𝒯 ,ℛ) be a qualification system.
Allocation rule ℛ is fair if:
∙ there exists a common monotonic ranking 𝑆 in each group such that 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖,
1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑘 and 𝑥 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦 implies ℛ(𝑉, 𝑥) ≥ ℛ(𝑉, 𝑦);
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∙ there exists an extra group function 𝒢 such that 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋𝑘+1 implies |𝑋 𝑖𝑥| = |𝑋 𝑖𝑦|;
∙ there exists a monotonic extra group ranking 𝑄 such that 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋𝑘+1 and
𝑥 ≻𝑄(𝑉 ) 𝑦 implies ℛ(𝑉, 𝑥) ≥ ℛ(𝑉, 𝑦).
The idea behind a fair allocation rule is straightforward. Application of a monotonic
ranking in groups ensures that teams have no incentive to exert a lower effort in any match
since they cannot achieve a higher position in the group by deliberately playing worse.
As it is also required in the extra group, extra group ranking 𝑄 should be monotonic.
The second condition is responsible for fairness in the comparison of teams from different
groups: if their number of matches considered in the extra group is different, number of
points is not a good measure of performance as it cannot decrease if more matches are
played.
Definition 5.15. Manipulation: Consider a qualification system (𝒯 ,ℛ) and a set of
group results 𝑉 =
{︁
𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣𝑖, . . . , 𝑣𝑘
}︁
. A team 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 can manipulate the qualification
system (𝒯 ,ℛ) if there exists a set of group results 𝑉 =
{︁
𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣𝑖, . . . , 𝑣𝑘
}︁
such that
𝑣𝑖2(𝑥, 𝑦) ≥ 𝑣𝑖2(𝑥, 𝑦) and 𝑣𝑖1(𝑦, 𝑥) ≥ 𝑣𝑖1(𝑦, 𝑥) for all 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 and ℛ(𝑉, 𝑥) < ℛ(𝑉 , 𝑥).
Manipulation means that team 𝑥 can improve its position with respect to qualification
by letting its opponents to score more goals.
Definition 5.16. Strategy-proofness: A qualification system (𝒯 ,ℛ) is called strategy-
proof if there exists no set of group results 𝑉 =
{︁
𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣𝑘
}︁
under which a team can
manipulate it.
Our main results concern the strategy-proofness of qualification systems which have a
fair allocation rule.
Theorem 5.1. Let (𝒯 ,ℛ) be a qualification system such that ℛ is a fair allocation rule
and the following conditions hold:
∙ the number of groups is at least 𝑘 ≥ 2;
∙ there is a difference in the allocation of teams in the extra group, that is, if
𝑥 ∈ 𝑋𝑘+1, then there exists 𝑧 ∈ 𝑋𝑘+1 such that ℛ(𝑉, 𝑥) ̸= ℛ(𝑉, 𝑧);
∙ there exists a team 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 ∩𝑋𝑘+1 such that
⃒⃒⃒{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑥 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦
}︁⃒⃒⃒
≥ ℓ+ 1 and
𝑧 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 ∖ {𝑥} if and only if ℓ =
⃒⃒⃒{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑧 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦
}︁⃒⃒⃒
≥ 1.
Then qualification system (𝒯 ,ℛ) does not satisfy strategy-proofness.
According to the second requirement of Theorem 5.1, teams of the extra group are
treated differently by the allocation rule. The third condition means that if a team is
considered in the extra group where matches played against the lowest ranked ℓ teams of
its group are discarded, then at least ℓ+ 1 teams ranked lower than it can be found in the
group.
Proof. An example is presented where a team can manipulate a qualification system
satisfying all criteria of Theorem 5.1.
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Table 3: Group 1 of Example 5.1
GF = Goals for; GA = Goals against; GD = Goal difference; Pts = Points.
Last but one row contains the group winner’s benchmark results, adjusted for ranking in the extra group
(matches played against the last team are discarded) according to the allocation rule ℛ.
Last row contains the group winner’s alternative results, adjusted for ranking in the extra group (matches
played against the last team are discarded) according to the allocation rule ℛ, obtained if team 𝑎
manipulates.
Position Team 𝑎 𝑏 𝑐 GF GA GD Pts
1 𝑎 — 3-0 4-0 7 2 5 2𝛼 + 1
2 𝑏 2-0 — 1-0 3 6 -3 2𝛼
3 𝑐 0-0 3-0 — 3 5 -2 𝛼 + 1
1 𝑎 — — — 3 2 1 𝛼
1* 𝑎* — — — 4* 1* 3* 𝛼*
Example 5.1. Let 𝑘 = 2, 𝑋1 = {𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐} and 𝑋2 = {𝑑, 𝑒}.
Consider the fair allocation rule ℛ such that 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋3 if and only if 𝑥 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦 for all
𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖, 𝑥 ̸= 𝑦, 𝑋 𝑖𝑥 =
{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 ∖ {𝑥} :
⃒⃒⃒{︁
𝑧 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑧 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦
}︁⃒⃒⃒
= 1
}︁
and
ℛ(𝑉, 𝑥) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
0 if 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 and there exists a team 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑥 ≺𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦
0 if 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋3 and there exists a team 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋𝑘+1 : 𝑥 ≺𝑄(𝑉 ) 𝑦
2 otherwise
ℛ says that teams not winning their group are eliminated, so the extra group consists of
the two remaining teams and the one ranked higher by 𝑄 – after the two matches of the
first team against the third in Group 1 are discarded – qualifies.
A possible set of results in Group 1 is shown in Table 3. Team 𝑎 should be the first
since it has the most points (see criterion 1 of a monotonic group ranking method), and it is
considered in the extra group with 𝛼 points and a goal difference of +1 after discarding its
two matches against team 𝑐, which is the last in Group 1 due to criterion 1 of a monotonic
group ranking method.
There are only two matches to be played in Group 2. Let 𝑣2 be given such that
𝑣2(𝑑, 𝑒) = (3; 0) and 𝑣2(𝑒, 𝑑) = (1; 0). Then team 𝑑 should be the first (see criterion 2 of a
monotonic group ranking method) and would be considered in the extra group with 𝛼
points and a goal difference of +2. Consequently, ℛ(𝑉, 𝑎) = 0 and ℛ(𝑉, 𝑑) = 1 due to
criterion 2 of a monotonic extra group ranking method 𝑄.
Now examine what happens if 𝑣1(𝑎, 𝑐) = (1; 0) instead of 𝑣1(𝑎, 𝑐) = (4; 0). Then teams
𝑎, 𝑏 and 𝑐 have 2𝛼 points and head-to-head goal differences of +4, −3 and −1, respectively,
thus 𝑎 is the first and 𝑐 is the second according to criterion 2 of a monotonic group ranking
method. Therefore, team 𝑎 is considered with 𝛼 points and a goal difference of +3 in the
extra group. Then ℛ(𝑉 , 𝑎) = 1 and ℛ(𝑉 , 𝑑) = 0 due to criterion 2 of a monotonic extra
group ranking method 𝑄.
To summarize, team 𝑎 can manipulate this qualification structure under a set of group
results 𝑉 , so it is not strategy-proof.
Example 5.1 has the least possible number of teams, three in the first and two in the
second group. It is clear that the number of groups and the number of teams in them as well
as parameter ℓ can be increased without changing the essence of the counterexample.
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Remark 5.1. 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA), discussed in Section 3, fits into
the model presented above. The number of groups is 𝑘 = 9 and the allocation rule ℛ is as
follows:
∙ 𝑆 is monotonic because number of points is the first and goal difference is the
second tie-breaker in groups (Definition 5.6);
∙ 𝑄 is monotonic because number of points is the first and goal difference is the
second tie-breaker in the extra group (Definition 5.13);
∙ the first-placed team in each group qualifies: ℛ(𝑉, 𝑥) = 2 for all 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 if and
only if @𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑦 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑥;
∙ the third-, fourth-, fifth- and sixth-placed teams in each group are eliminated:
ℛ(𝑉, 𝑥) = 0 for all 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 if
⃒⃒⃒{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑦 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑥
}︁⃒⃒⃒
≥ 2;
∙ the extra group consists of the second-placed teams: 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋𝑘+1 if and only if⃒⃒⃒{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑦 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑥
}︁⃒⃒⃒
= 1;
∙ matches against the last team are discarded in the extra group: if 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋𝑘+1, then
𝑧 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 ∖ (𝑋 𝑖𝑥 ∪ {𝑥}) if and only if 𝑦 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑧 for all 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 ∖ {𝑧};
∙ the worst second-placed team is eliminated: ℛ(𝑉, 𝑥) = 0 if 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋𝑘+1 and
𝑦 ≻𝑄(𝑉 ) 𝑥 for all 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋𝑘+1 ∖ {𝑥};
∙ the eight best second-placed teams advance to the next round: ℛ(𝑉, 𝑥) = 1 if
𝑥 ∈ 𝑋𝑘+1 and ∃𝑦 ∈ 𝑋𝑘+1 : 𝑥 ≻𝑄(𝑉 ) 𝑦.
According to Definition 5.14, allocation rule ℛ is fair because of the monotonicity of
ranking methods 𝑆 and 𝑄 together with |𝑋 𝑖𝑣| = 5 for all 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋𝑘+1.
Proposition 5.1. 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA) is not strategy-proof.
Proof. The scenario presented in the proof of Proposition 4.1 shows that team Bulgaria =
𝑥 ∈ 𝑋1 can manipulate since there exist sets of group results 𝑉 = {𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣9} and
𝑉 = {𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣9} such that 𝑣1 = 𝑣1 with the exception of 𝑣11(𝑦, 𝑥) = 1 > 0 = 𝑣11(𝑦, 𝑥),
where team Luxembourg = 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋1 and ℛ(𝑉, 𝑥) = 0 < 1 = ℛ(𝑉 , 𝑥).
Theorem 5.1 can also be applied because of Remark 5.1: the allocation rule is fair,
the number of groups is 9 > 2, ℛ(𝑉, 𝑥) can be 0 or 1 if team 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋𝑘+1 is in the extra
group, and, finally, 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 ∩𝑋𝑘+1 implies that
⃒⃒⃒{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑥 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦
}︁⃒⃒⃒
= 4, furthermore,
𝑧 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 ∖ {𝑥} if and only if
⃒⃒⃒{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑧 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦
}︁⃒⃒⃒
= 1.
Theorem 5.1 also proves the incentive incompatibility of 2014 FIFA World Cup qualifi-
cation (UEFA), which has already been verified by Dagaev and Sonin (2013).
Now we state a positive result, a ’pair’ of Theorem 5.1.
Theorem 5.2. Let (𝒯 ,ℛ) be a qualification system such that ℛ is a fair allocation rule
and at least one of the following conditions hold:
a) there is no need for an extra group;
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b) there is no difference in the allocation of teams in the extra group, that is,
ℛ(𝑉, 𝑥) = ℛ(𝑉, 𝑦) for all 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋𝑘+1;11
c) there exists no team 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 ∩𝑋𝑘+1 such that
⃒⃒⃒{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑥 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦
}︁⃒⃒⃒
≥ ℓ+ 1 and
𝑧 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 ∖ {𝑥} if and only if ℓ =
⃒⃒⃒{︁
𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖 : 𝑧 ≻𝑆(𝑣𝑖) 𝑦
}︁⃒⃒⃒
≥ 1;
d) 𝑋 𝑖𝑥 is independent of 𝑣𝑖 for all 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋𝑘+1.
Then qualification system (𝒯 ,ℛ) satisfies strategy-proofness.
Proof. If there is no need for an extra group, monotonicity of 𝑆 provides strategy-proofness.
If there is no difference in the allocation of teams in the extra group, then a team may
improve its position in the extra group, but it has no incentives to cheat.
If all group matches are taken into account in the extra group or there exists no team
ranked lower in the original group 𝑋 𝑖 than any team 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 𝑖∩𝑋𝑘+1 of the extra group such
that matches against it are considered in the extra group, than team 𝑥 cannot manipulate
by changing the set of its matches to be ignored because of the monotonicity of 𝑆 and 𝑄.
If 𝑋 𝑖𝑥 is independent of 𝑣𝑖, then ℛ(𝑉, 𝑥) = ℛ(𝑉 , 𝑥) under any sets of group results 𝑉 ={︁
𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣𝑘
}︁
and 𝑉 =
{︁
𝑣1, 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣𝑖, . . . , 𝑣𝑘
}︁
, so team 𝑥 has no way to manipulate.
The message of Theorem 5.2 for tournament organizers will be discussed later.
6 Discussion
It is known from Dagaev and Sonin (2013) and Proposition 5.1 that 2014 and 2018 FIFA
World Cup qualifications (UEFA) were not strategy-proof. Qualifications to recent UEFA
European Championships (UEFA Euro) and FIFA World Cups in the European Zone
(World Cup (UEFA)) are analysed with respect to this property in Table 4. We have
devised Theorem 5.1 and Theorem 5.2 such that they will be enough to answer the
question.
UEFA European Championship is hold every four years since 1960. The qualifications
for the tournaments between 1960 and 1992 were organized without an extra group, so
they were strategy-proof due to condition a) of Theorem 5.2. Incentive compatibility of
the 2004 and 2008 qualifying is provided by condition b) of Theorem 5.2. UEFA Euro
2020 qualifying is linked with the 2018-19 edition of the UEFA Nations League, which
gives countries a secondary route to qualify for the final tournament. This format is not
covered by our theoretical model, but it also violates strategy-proofness because of the
findings of Dagaev and Sonin (2017).
The first incentive incompatible FIFA World Cup qualifications in the European
zone was the 1998 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA). Nevertheless, the fairness of
the 1994 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA) seems to be questionable as it is less
difficult to achieve the two top positions in a group containing five or six teams than in a
group with seven teams. The 2002 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA) again satisfied
strategy-proofness due to the lack of extra group.
11 Note that allocation rule ℛ does not take seeding in play-offs into account. It is not a problem if
play-offs are drawn randomly (like in the UEFA Euro 2000 qualifying) or based on an exogenous ranking
of the teams (like in the 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA)). However, if, for example, the best
half of all teams advanced to play-offs from the extra group are placed in Pot 1, then there is a difference
in the allocation of teams in the extra group, although it is not reflected by the allocation rule ℛ.
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Tu summarize, at least nine recent incentive incompatible qualifications (to the 1996,
2000, 2012 and 2016 UEFA European Championships as well as to the 1998, 2006, 2010,
2014 and 2018 FIFA World Cups in the European Zone) can be identified on the basis
of the theoretical results presented in Section 5. This finding carries a really frightening
message for FIFA and UEFA: it has had a positive probability that a serious scandal
occurs during a recent qualification, for example, in October 2017 as shown in a detailed
example. It would be especially disturbing because Luxembourg would have practically no
incentive to interfere with the manipulation of Bulgaria in order to prevent the elimination
of Montenegro, and it may even interested in scoring a goal to be the fifth in the group.
Fortunately, the situation has not materialized, and currently we do not know about any
attempt to manipulate these qualifications in the way presented above. Probably the
closest case was France against Israel in the 1996 UEFA Euro qualifying, where France
would have better measures among runners-up if it would have scored two own goals
(Csato´, 2017d).
7 A strategy-proof mechanism for qualifications
We think the lack of observations of dishonest behaviour does not reduce the value of
strategy-proofness, especially if it can be satisfied without significant rule changes. For
instance, in the 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA), the root of the problem
resides in the difference of group and second-places teams ranking by discarding the
matches against the sixth-placed teams in the latter case. The greatest pity about this
situation is that it could have been straightforward to avoid by UEFA ditching the strange
policy of ignoring some group matches, since all groups would have six teams following the
admission of Gibraltar and Kosovo. Yet they chose not to modify the rules. According to
an UEFA News (UEFA, 2017), released on 10 October 2017, after the end of group stage:
’the exclusion of results against sixth-placed teams was retained to alleviate any possible
imbalance between the qualifying groups caused by the late introductions of Gibraltar and
Kosovo’. While it is respectable that organizers wanted to prevent some mathematically
unprovable imbalances between the groups, they have sacrificed the much more clear and
important theroretical issue of incentive compatibility.
However, it seems to be necessary to present a incentive compatible design in order to
argue against the rules of recent qualifications. Let us examine Theorem 5.2 and search
for strategy-proof qualification systems:
a) There is no need for an extra group: It holds if all groups have the same number
of teams, which may conflict with divisibility. However, we suggest to choose this
solution when it remains possible.
b) There is no difference in the allocation of teams in the extra group: It practically
means that all second- or third-placed teams either qualify or advance to play-offs
regardless that some groups may have more teams. For example, UEFA Euro
2004 qualifying was strategy-proof since the top team in each group automatically
qualified, and all runners-up were paired for play-offs.
c) Teams of the extra group have played no matches considered in the extra group
against teams ranked lower in their groups: If there are around 50 competing
teams, it requires small group sizes (with few group matches and an increased
randomness), standard group sizes with more rounds (which increases the number
17
of matches to be played by a given team), or the ignorance of a large number of
matches in the extra group.
Nonetheless, this condition provides the strategy-proofness of 2018 European
Men’s Handball Championship qualification phase 2 where the 32 teams were
divided into seven groups of four teams each such that the top two teams of
each group and the best third-ranked team (determined by considering only the
matches played against the first and second team) qualified. Since there was only
one team ranked lower in the groups than the teams of the extra group, they
cannot manipulate by changing the set of matches ignored in the extra group.
d) Matches to be discarded in the extra group are independent of group results: We
think it could be the ultimate solution. Social choice theory usually opposes
the violation of anonymity at all costs, but let us study how groups are seeded:
if 𝑛 teams should be drawn into 𝑘 groups, there would be 𝑘 teams in Pot 1, 𝑘
teams in Pot 2 and so on, until Pot 𝑚 with 𝑘 < ℓ < 2𝑘 (as in UEFA Euro 2008
qualifying) or with ℓ ≤ 𝑘 (as in 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA))
is reached. As the difference in group sizes is caused by Pot 𝑚, it is fair and
straightforward to discard the matches played against the team from Pot 𝑚 in
the ranking of the extra group, which immediately provides strategy-proofness
according to Theorem 5.2.
In the case of 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA) it means to fix in
advance that matches played against teams in Pot 6 (Luxembourg, Andorra, San
Marino, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Malta, Liechtenstein as well as the lately introduced
Gibraltar and Kosovo) are discarded in the comparison of second-placed teams.
Since only Luxembourg and Georgia obtained a better (the fifth) position in the
qualification, this policy does not make much difference in practice.
Nevertheless, a problem may arise when a team from Pot𝑚 should be considered in
the extra group due its unexpectedly good performance.12 The unlikely scenario13
can be immediately solved by discarding the match against the team in Pot 𝑚− 1
in the case of this particular team, which does not ruin strategy-proofness.
To summarize, we suggest to follow the subsequent mechanism in order to guarantee
the strategy-proofness of a qualification system: (1) policy a) if the number of teams 𝑛 can
be divided by the number of groups 𝑘; (2) policy b) if 𝑛 is not divisible by 𝑘 but teams
in the extra group can be treated uniformly (which is certainly impossible if the extra
group contains an odd number of teams); (3) policy d) if the first two policies cannot be
implemented.
Another solution might be an artificial reduction of the number of teams in order to
achieve equal group sizes. For instance, the weakest teams (e.g. Gibraltar, Liechtenstein,
San Marino etc.) can be relegated to a special group, where they play against each other
without the possibility of direct qualification. The winner of this group may advance to a
play-off with the best runner-up or third-placed team. Besides excluding manipulation,
this solution has the further benefit of giving a chance for lower-ranked national teams,
mainly composed of amateur players, to compete in their own league and enjoy more
success than scoring some lucky goals against professional sportsmen.14
12 We are grateful to De´nes Pa´lvo¨lgyi for spotting this issue.
13 One of the greatest surprise occurred in 2016 UEFA Euro qualifying when Greece finished as the
last team in Group F despite it was drawn from Pot 1.
14 This idea may partially inspired UEFA Nations League, which starts in September 2018 and is
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It is also possible to organize a preliminary round for lower-ranked teams such as in
the CEV qualification for the 2018 FIVB Volleyball Men’s World Championship. One can
also follow the solution applied in the European zone of qualification for the 1990 FIFA
World Cup: the runner-up (or third-placed team) to be directly qualified / eliminated is
chosen from the groups containing more / less teams without discarding any matches.
8 Conclusions
Design of appropriate sport ranking rules is an important theoretical problem of economics
and operations research. Tournament organizers may face unpleasant situations when they
miss analysing strategy-proofness. While manipulation is often a low-probability event,
the potential costs can be enormous. We have demonstrated that decision makers have
chosen a risky strategy in the case of qualification tournaments to some recent UEFA
European Championships and FIFA World Cups.
We hope the paper has reinforced that the scientific community and the sports industry
should work more closely together in studying the effects of potential rules and rule changes
even before they are implemented. For example, the governing bodies of major sports may
invite academics to identify possible loopholes in proposed regulations in order to prevent
serious scandals.
There are at least two possible directions for future research. First, a number of sport
ranking rules can be investigated from the perspective of incentive (in)compatibility. We
plan to write some follow-up papers on this topic. Second, similarly to Berker (2014)
and Lasek et al. (2016), the current theory-oriented investigation can be supplemented
by estimating the probability of manipulation with the use of historical and Monte-Carlo
simulated data.
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Appendix
Table A.1: 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification – UEFA Group B
(a) Match results of the first eight matchdays
Position is given according to the eight matches already played
Home team is in the row, away team (represented by its position) is in the column
Dates are given for the matches to be played on the last two matchdays in 2017
Position Team 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 Switzerland — 2-0 7 Oct 2-0 3-0 1-0
2 Portugal 10 Oct — 3-0 5-1 6-0 4-1
3 Hungary 2-3 0-1 — 10 Oct 4-0 3-1
4 Faroe Islands 0-2 0-6 0-0 — 1-0 7 Oct
5 Andorra 1-2 7 Oct 1-0 0-0 — 0-1
6 Latvia 0-3 0-3 0-2 0-2 10 Oct —
(b) Hypothetical but reasonable match results of the last two matchdays
Date Home team Away team Result
7 October 2017 Faroe Islands Latvia 0-0
7 October 2017 Andorra Portugal 0-3
7 October 2017 Switzerland Hungary 2-0
10 October 2017 Hungary Faroe Islands 2-0
10 October 2017 Latvia Andorra 1-1
10 October 2017 Portugal Switzerland 1-1
(c) Final standing with the runner-up results
Pos = Position; W = Won; D = Drawn; L = Loss; GF = Goals for; GA = Goals against; GD = Goal
difference; Pts = Points. All teams have played 10 matches.
Last row contains the second-placed team’s results, adjusted for the ranking of the runners-up (matches
played against the 6th team are discarded) according to FIFA (2017).
Pos Team W D L GF GA GD Pts
1 Switzerland 9 1 0 21 4 17 28
2 Portugal 8 1 1 32 5 27 25
3 Hungary 4 1 5 13 11 2 13
4 Faroe Islands 2 3 5 4 17 -13 9
5 Latvia 1 2 7 4 19 -15 5
6 Andorra 1 2 7 3 21 -18 5
2 Portugal 6 1 1 23 5 18 19
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Table A.2: 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification – UEFA Group C
(a) Match results of the first eight matchdays
Position is given according to the eight matches already played
Home team is in the row, away team (represented by its position) is in the column
Dates are given for the matches to be played on the last two matchdays in 2017
Position Team 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 Germany — 2-0 8 Oct 3-0 6-0 7-0
2 Northern Ireland 5 Oct — 4-0 2-0 2-0 4-0
3 Azerbaijan 1-4 0-1 — 5 Oct 1-0 5-1
4 Czech Republic 1-2 0-0 0-0 — 2-1 8 Oct
5 Norway 0-3 8 Oct 2-0 1-1 — 4-1
6 San Marino 0-8 0-3 0-1 0-6 5 Oct —
(b) Hypothetical but reasonable match results of the last two matchdays
Date Home team Away team Result
5 October 2017 Azerbaijan Czech Republic 1-1
5 October 2017 Northern Ireland Germany 0-1
5 October 2017 San Marino Norway 0-2
8 October 2017 Czech Republic San Marino 3-0
8 October 2017 Germany Azerbaijan 2-0
8 October 2017 Norway Northern Ireland 0-0
(c) Final standing with the runner-up results
Pos = Position; W = Won; D = Drawn; L = Loss; GF = Goals for; GA = Goals against; GD = Goal
difference; Pts = Points. All teams have played 10 matches.
Last row contains the second-placed team’s results, adjusted for the ranking of the runners-up (matches
played against the 6th team are discarded) according to FIFA (2017).
Pos Team W D L GF GA GD Pts
1 Germany 10 0 0 38 2 36 30
2 Northern Ireland 6 2 2 16 3 13 20
3 Czech Republic 3 4 3 14 10 4 13
4 Norway 3 2 5 10 16 -6 11
5 Azerbaijan 3 2 5 9 15 -6 11
6 San Marino 0 0 10 2 43 -41 0
2 Northern Ireland 4 2 2 9 3 6 14
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Table A.3: 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification – UEFA Group D
(a) Match results of the first eight matchdays
Position is given according to the eight matches already played
Home team is in the row, away team (represented by its position) is in the column
Dates are given for the matches to be played on the last two matchdays in 2017
Position Team 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 Serbia — 1-1 2-2 3-2 9 Oct 3-0
2 Wales 1-1 — 9 Oct 1-0 1-1 4-0
3 Republic of Ireland 0-1 0-0 — 1-1 1-0 6 Oct
4 Austria 6 Oct 2-2 0-1 — 1-1 2-0
5 Georgia 1-3 6 Oct 1-1 1-2 — 1-1
6 Moldova 0-3 0-2 1-3 9 Oct 2-2 —
(b) Hypothetical but reasonable match results of the last two matchdays
Date Home team Away team Result
6 October 2017 Georgia Wales 0-1
6 October 2017 Austria Serbia 0-0
6 October 2017 Republic of Ireland Moldova 2-0
9 October 2017 Moldova Austria 1-2
9 October 2017 Serbia Georgia 1-1
9 October 2017 Wales Republic of Ireland 1-0
(c) Final standing with the runner-up results
Pos = Position; W = Won; D = Drawn; L = Loss; GF = Goals for; GA = Goals against; GD = Goal
difference; Pts = Points. All teams have played 10 matches.
Last row contains the second-placed team’s results, adjusted for the ranking of the runners-up (matches
played against the 6th team are discarded) according to FIFA (2017).
Pos Team W D L GF GA GD Pts
1 Serbia 5 5 0 18 8 10 20
2 Wales 5 5 0 14 5 9 20
3 Republic of Ireland 4 4 2 11 7 4 16
4 Austria 3 4 3 12 11 1 13
5 Georgia 0 6 4 9 14 -5 6
6 Moldova 0 2 8 5 24 -19 2
2 Wales 3 5 0 8 5 3 14
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Table A.4: 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification – UEFA Group E
(a) Match results of the first eight matchdays
Position is given according to the eight matches already played
Home team is in the row, away team (represented by its position) is in the column
Dates are given for the matches to be played on the last two matchdays in 2017
Position Team 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 Poland — 8 Oct 3-2 3-1 2-1 3-0
2 Montenegro 1-2 — 5 Oct 1-0 4-1 5-0
3 Denmark 4-0 0-1 — 8 Oct 1-0 4-1
4 Romania 0-3 1-1 0-0 — 1-0 5 Oct
5 Armenia 5 Oct 3-2 1-4 0-5 — 2-0
6 Kazakhstan 2-2 0-3 1-3 0-0 8 Oct —
(b) Hypothetical but reasonable match results of the last two matchdays
Date Home team Away team Result
5 October 2017 Armenia Poland 1-5
5 October 2017 Montenegro Denmark 0-0
5 October 2017 Romania Kazakhstan 2-0
8 October 2017 Denmark Romania 1-1
8 October 2017 Kazakhstan Armenia 1-0
8 October 2017 Poland Montenegro 1-1
(c) Final standing with the runner-up results
Pos = Position; W = Won; D = Drawn; L = Loss; GF = Goals for; GA = Goals against; GD = Goal
difference; Pts = Points. All teams have played 10 matches.
Last row contains the second-placed team’s results, adjusted for the ranking of the runners-up (matches
played against the 6th team are discarded) according to FIFA (2017).
Note: Montenegro is ranked above Denmark due to FIFA (2016, Article 20.6d) because it has obtained 4
points against Denmark, while Denmark has obtained only 1 point against Montenegro.
Pos Team W D L GF GA GD Pts
1 Poland 7 2 1 24 13 11 23
2 Montenegro 5 3 2 19 8 11 18
3 Denmark 5 3 2 19 8 11 18
4 Romania 3 4 3 11 9 2 13
5 Armenia 2 0 8 9 25 -16 6
6 Kazakhstan 1 2 7 5 24 -19 5
2 Montenegro 3 3 2 12 6 6 12
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Table A.5: 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification – UEFA Group F
(a) Match results of the first eight matchdays
Position is given according to the eight matches already played
Home team is in the row, away team (represented by its position) is in the column
Dates are given for the matches to be played on the last two matchdays in 2017
Position Team 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 England — 2-1 5 Oct 3-0 2-0 2-0
2 Slovakia 0-1 — 1-0 3-0 4-0 8 Oct
3 Slovenia 0-0 1-0 — 8 Oct 4-0 2-0
4 Scotland 2-2 5 Oct 1-0 — 1-1 2-0
5 Lithuania 8 Oct 1-2 2-2 0-3 — 2-0
6 Malta 0-4 1-3 0-1 1-5 5 Oct —
(b) Hypothetical but reasonable match results of the last two matchdays
Date Home team Away team Result
5 October 2017 England Slovenia 2-1
5 October 2017 Malta Lithuania 0-1
5 October 2017 Scotland Slovakia 0-0
8 October 2017 Lithuania England 1-3
8 October 2017 Slovakia Malta 3-0
8 October 2017 Slovenia Scotland 1-0
(c) Final standing with the runner-up results
Pos = Position; W = Won; D = Drawn; L = Loss; GF = Goals for; GA = Goals against; GD = Goal
difference; Pts = Points. All teams have played 10 matches.
Last row contains the second-placed team’s results, adjusted for the ranking of the runners-up (matches
played against the 6th team are discarded) according to FIFA (2017).
Pos Team W D L GF GA GD Pts
1 England 8 2 0 21 5 16 26
2 Slovakia 6 1 3 17 6 11 19
3 Slovenia 5 2 3 12 6 6 17
4 Scotland 4 3 3 14 11 3 15
5 Lithuania 2 2 6 8 21 -13 8
6 Malta 0 0 10 2 25 -23 0
2 Slovakia 4 1 3 11 5 6 13
26
Table A.6: 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification – UEFA Group G
(a) Match results of the first eight matchdays
Position is given according to the eight matches already played
Home team is in the row, away team (represented by its position) is in the column
Dates are given for the matches to be played on the last two matchdays in 2017
Position Team 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 Spain — 3-0 6 Oct 4-1 4-0 8-0
2 Italy 1-1 — 2-0 1-0 6 Oct 5-0
3 Albania 0-2 9 Oct — 0-3 2-1 2-0
4 Israel 9 Oct 1-3 0-3 — 0-1 2-1
5 FYR Macedonia 1-2 2-3 1-1 1-2 — 9 Oct
6 Liechtenstein 0-8 0-4 0-2 6 Oct 0-3 —
(b) Hypothetical but reasonable match results of the last two matchdays
Date Home team Away team Result
6 October 2017 Italy FYR Macedonia 2-0
6 October 2017 Liechtenstein Israel 0-1
6 October 2017 Spain Albania 3-1
9 October 2017 Albania Italy 1-2
9 October 2017 Israel Spain 0-3
9 October 2017 FYR Macedonia Liechtenstein 2-1
(c) Final standing with the runner-up results
Pos = Position; W = Won; D = Drawn; L = Loss; GF = Goals for; GA = Goals against; GD = Goal
difference; Pts = Points. All teams have played 10 matches.
Last row contains the second-placed team’s results, adjusted for the ranking of the runners-up (matches
played against the 6th team are discarded) according to FIFA (2017).
Pos Team W D L GF GA GD Pts
1 Spain 9 1 0 36 3 33 28
2 Italy 8 1 1 23 8 15 25
3 Albania 4 1 5 12 14 -2 13
4 Israel 4 0 6 10 17 -7 12
5 FYR Macedonia 3 1 6 12 17 -5 10
6 Liechtenstein 0 0 10 2 36 -34 0
2 Italy 6 1 1 14 8 6 19
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Table A.7: 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification – UEFA Group H
(a) Match results of the first eight matchdays
Position is given according to the eight matches already played
Home team is in the row, away team (represented by its position) is in the column
Dates are given for the matches to be played on the last two matchdays in 2017
Bosnia and Herz. stands for Bosnia and Herzegovina
Position Team 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 Belgium — 4-0 1-1 10 Oct 8-1 9-0
2 Bosnia and Herz. 7 Oct — 0-0 2-0 5-0 5-0
3 Greece 1-2 1-1 — 2-0 0-0 10 Oct
4 Cyprus 0-3 3-2 7 Oct — 0-0 3-1
5 Estonia 0-2 10 Oct 0-2 1-0 — 4-0
6 Gibraltar 0-6 0-4 1-4 1-2 7 Oct —
(b) Hypothetical but reasonable match results of the last two matchdays
Date Home team Away team Result
7 October 2017 Gibraltar Estonia 0-1
7 October 2017 Bosnia and Herzegovina Belgium 0-3
7 October 2017 Cyprus Greece 0-1
10 October 2017 Belgium Cyprus 3-1
10 October 2017 Estonia Bosnia and Herzegovina 1-2
10 October 2017 Greece Gibraltar 3-0
(c) Final standing with the runner-up results
Pos = Position; W = Won; D = Drawn; L = Loss; GF = Goals for; GA = Goals against; GD = Goal
difference; Pts = Points. All teams have played 10 matches.
Last row contains the second-placed team’s results, adjusted for the ranking of the runners-up (matches
played against the 6th team are discarded) according to FIFA (2017).
Pos Team W D L GF GA GD Pts
1 Belgium 9 1 0 40 4 36 28
2 Greece 5 4 1 15 5 10 19
3 Bosnia and Herzegovina 5 2 3 21 11 10 17
4 Cyprus 3 1 5 9 16 -7 11
5 Estonia 3 2 5 8 19 -11 11
6 Gibraltar 0 0 10 3 41 -38 0
2 Greece 3 4 1 8 4 4 13
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Table A.8: 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification – UEFA Group I
(a) Match results of the first eight matchdays
Position is given according to the eight matches already played
Home team is in the row, away team (represented by its position) is in the column
Dates are given for the matches to be played on the last two matchdays in 2017
Position Team 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 Croatia — 2-0 1-1 1-0 6 Oct 1-0
2 Iceland 1-0 — 2-0 2-0 3-2 9 Oct
3 Turkey 1-0 6 Oct — 2-2 2-0 2-0
4 Ukraine 9 Oct 1-1 2-0 — 1-0 3-0
5 Finland 0-1 1-0 9 Oct 1-2 — 1-1
6 Kosovo 0-6 1-2 1-4 6 Oct 0-1 —
(b) Hypothetical but reasonable match results of the last two matchdays
Date Home team Away team Result
6 October 2017 Croatia Finland 2-0
6 October 2017 Kosovo Ukraine 0-2
6 October 2017 Turkey Iceland 2-1
9 October 2017 Finland Turkey 0-1
9 October 2017 Iceland Kosovo 1-0
9 October 2017 Ukraine Croatia 0-0
(c) Final standing with the runner-up results
Pos = Position; W = Won; D = Drawn; L = Loss; GF = Goals for; GA = Goals against; GD = Goal
difference; Pts = Points. All teams have played 10 matches.
Last row contains the second-placed team’s results, adjusted for the ranking of the runners-up (matches
played against the 6th team are discarded) according to FIFA (2017).
Pos Team W D L GF GA GD Pts
1 Croatia 6 2 2 14 3 11 20
2 Turkey 6 2 2 14 9 5 20
3 Ukraine 5 3 2 13 7 6 19
4 Iceland 6 1 3 13 9 4 19
5 Finland 2 1 7 6 12 -6 7
6 Kosovo 0 1 9 3 23 -20 1
2 Turkey 4 2 2 8 8 0 14
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